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SITUATING A FEMINIST CRITICISM OF JOHN
RAWLS'S POLITICAL LIBERALISM
S.A. Lloyd*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The theory Rawls develops in PoliticalLiberalism1 is, for all its
innovations, a form of liberalism, and as such is at least prima facie
subject to a number of familiar feminist criticisms. Feminists have argued that liberal political theories, particularly those in the social contract tradition, are overly abstract and individualistic. Moreover, they
fail to acknowledge the profound effect gender structures have on our
identities and social roles. Furthermore, liberal political theories rely
on a distinction between public and private life that entrenches sexist
and patriarchal practices. 2 These familiar criticisms take aim against
most all liberal political theories, including those of Raz,3 Dworkin,4
and Kymlicka, 5 as well as of Rawls. If these criticisms cannot be answered, all of these theories are in serious trouble. But if we want to
see what is distinctive about Rawls's version of liberalism, we do best
to focus on a feminist criticism to which only Rawls's political liberalism is subject.
Before I lay out such a criticism, it may be worthwhile to comment on the painstaking way in which I shall formulate and situate
this criticism. Rawls's theory of justice forms a system as complex and
imposing as any philosophers have yet devised. This exceedingly intricate structure has frequently frustrated critics who, having loosely
formed an intuitively plausible criticism of the theory, take aim and let
fly their criticism only to see some elaborate piece of theoretical ma* Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California; Ph.D.,
Harvard University, 1987. An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the Jurisprudence Section Program, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 8, 1995.
1. JOHN RAwLS, POLmCAL LIBERALISM (1993).
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FRAZER & NIcoLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A
FEMINIST CRIIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE (1993).
3. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
4. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRIN, Why Liberals Should Care About Equality, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part1: Equality of

Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
5. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989).
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chinery rise up to deflect it. The result of such exchanges often seems
to be that Rawls cannot quite see how the criticism is supposed to
apply to his theory, or thinks vaguely that it is based on a misunderstanding. His critics find themselves silenced, perhaps, but certainly
not satisfied. Nowhere has this dynamic been more evident than in
feminist criticisms of Rawls's theory.6 In an effort to avoid reproducing this unproductive pattern, I take care to formulate the criticism I
want to examine in Rawls's own terms and to situate it in precisely the
proper place in Rawls's theory, so that the theory cannot deflect but
rather must engage the criticism. I then go on to evaluate possible
Rawlsian responses to it.
The criticism I want to consider-one pioneered, though not sufficiently developed, by Susan Moller Okin in her recent essay in Ethics 7-is that because of certain of its own internal features, political
liberalism cannot rule out family practices that would systematically
undermine the stability of the very society Rawls envisions-the wellordered society of justice as fairness.8 Political liberalism is committed to allowing sexist upbringings of children that thwart children's
acquisition of the motivating attitudes on which the stability of the
well-ordered society depends.' This criticism is a feminist challenge
that attacks the internal logic of Rawls's own position, and so poses a
special threat to the tenability of poltical liberalism.
II. How ThE STRucruRE OF RAwLs's PROJECT GIVES RIsE TO
THE FEMINIST CONCERN

PoliticalLiberalism is explicitly framed as a discussion of the following issue: "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by
6. I witnessed this sort of failure to connect in Susan Moller Okin's remarks on Polit-

ical Liberalism, and in Rawls's response to them, at a conference held at University of

California, Riverside in 1993. It is also evident to a lesser degree in his written work-inprogress on "Women and the Family," on which I heavily rely in Part IV of this Essay.

John Rawls, Lecture IX: Political Liberalism: Women and the Family (Apr. 20,1994) (un-

published manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Women and the Family]. To some
of his feminist critics, Rawls's vague and largely promissory responses seem almost malevolent. See, eg., Linda R. -irshman, Is the OriginalPosition Inherently Male-Superior?,94
COLUM. L. REv. 1860, 1860-61 (1994) (expressing author's outraged reaction to what she
perceives to be Rawls's unresponsiveness to feminist criticisms).
7. Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHics 23,23-43
(1994).

8. 1d. at 37-39 (citing RAwts, supra note 1, at 141-42).
9. Id. at 35-37.
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reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?"' 10 Assuming, as Rawls does, that reasonable disagreement is an inescapable result of the exercise of reason under free institutions, we cannot expect
that all citizens will affirm the same comprehensive doctrine. So we
need to discover "[w]hat are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens characterized as free and equal yet divided by profound
doctrinal conflict?"'" How, in other words, should we allot public resources, resolve disputes, limit legislative restrictions, and assign con-'
stitutional protections to the forms of life represented by, say, Jerry
Falwell, Cardinal Mahoney, David Duke, Louis Farrakhan, Catherine
MacKinnon, Robert Mapplethorpe, and Snoop Doggy Dogg? The
fact of reasonable pluralism necessitates principles of justice to regulate different groups' pursuits of their own reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. Rawls argues that those principles must be articulated as
part of a free-standing political conception, detached from any particular comprehensive doctrine.
Those are the sort of principles Rawls means to propose. His
idea is that if we select principles from a position in-which all are represented as free and equal, none has a bargaining advantage, none
knows to which particular form of life she or he is committed, and
each is concerned with protecting the capacity to form, revise, and
pursue a conception of the good; it will, therefore, be impossible to
tailor the principles selected in order to promote some reasonable
forms of life over and against others.' 2
Given this description of Rawls's project, we can see at once why
a feminist might be alarmed. Any comprehensive feminist view of the
proper relation between men and women and the proper conception
of how family life should be ordered is reduced to one among many
possible reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This feminist view enjoys no special privilege when principles of justice are selected. There
is feminist view X, and then there is the Adam's rib, man's helpmate
view, if Rawls's principles allow different groups to pursue differing
forms of life, sexist and patriarchal practices and family forms may
find themselves protected, even though, from within feminist assumptions, these practices are plainly wrong and their underlying belief system demonstrably incorrect. Not only will the feminist find this
disturbing in itself, but if it can be shown that injustice in families undermines the stability of the just society, it will also pose a problem for
10. RAwI.s, supra note 1, at xxv.
11. Id.
12. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 60-62, 195-98.
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Rawls which the logic of his own position requires him to take seriously. But before we take up the latter question, let us consider
whether Rawls's theory really does require the protection of sexist
comprehensive doctrines.
III. CAN

RAwLS REFUSE TO ACCOMMODATE SEXIST

COMPR HENSrVE DocrRnss ON THE GROUND THEY
ARE UNREASONABLE?

One might suppose that Rawls need not protect sexist, racist, or
otherwise discriminatory comprehensive doctrines because discriminatory doctrines are unreasonable. This is essentially what Okin
asserts:
[S]urely women within [fundamentalist or orthodox] religions present a not much less extreme case [than slavery],
which raises the question whether such forms of indoctrination should be allowed in a well-ordered society. Indeed, we
must ask whether such views, while not uncommon in contemporary liberal societies, can be regarded as "reasonable"
by Rawls's definition of the term, which is very close to
"fair."...
...Surely the circumscription of women's roles in life,
their segregation in religious life, and their exclusion from
important religious functions and positions of leadershipdoctrines and practices that are still common to many varieties of religion-render them unreasonable by Rawls's own
13
criteria.
Certainly Rawls's theory regards the refusal to accommodate
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines as entirely proper.' 4 Rawls acknowledges that "[o]f course, a society may also contain unreasonable
and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case
the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the
unity and justice of society."' Only reasonable comprehensive doctrines are to be tolerated.
What then makes a view unreasonable? According to Rawls, any
view that wishes to use state power, which is understood to be the
corporate power of free and equal citizens, to deprive some citizens of

13. Okin,supra note 7, at 29-31 (emphasis added).
14. RAwLS, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii.
15. Id
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their equal basic rights and liberties is as such unreasonable, and not
to be permitted to succeed in its ends. 16 But racist, sexist, and other
sorts of discriminatory comprehensive doctrines that do not urge such
uses of state power are not automatically counted unreasonable. "Unreasonable" is not, in Rawls's parlance, a simple synonym for "unfair"
or "discriminatory." It is both a weaker and more precise notion that
makes use of Rawls's idea of the "burdens of judgment."17
The burdens of judgment offer an account of how reasonable
people, that is, people who are willing to propose and abide by fair
terms of cooperation with other free and equal persons, can nonetheless disagree in their comprehensive doctrines and secondary political
conclusions."8 The burdens of judgment account for the possibility of
reasonable disagreement in terms of differences in how the values relevant to settling a question are weighted, the complexity of the empirical evidence, the vagueness and indeterminacy of our concepts, and
so on.' 9 Since reasonable disagreement is possible, we need not assume that those who disagree with us are stupid, perverse, or corrupt
in order to account for the disagreement. According to Rawls, a
citizen among equal citizens is unreasonable if that citizen fails to recognize the burdens of judgment and their implications, the most important implication being that because reasonable disagreement is
possible and usual among the citizens of a free society, state power
should not be used to enforce the constituent views of one comprehensive doctrine on those who hold some other reasonable comprehensive doctrine.20
A comprehensive doctrine is to be counted as reasonable so long
as it does not reject the essentials of a constitutional regime,2 ' and
constitutes a coherent exercise of theoretical and practical reason, in
some cases as part of a standing tradition of thought and doctrine. 2
We can see that Rawls is operating with much more restricted
notions of "reasonable person" and "reasonable comprehensive doctrine" than Okin seems to imagine. By Rawls's criteria, as long as a
sexist comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a constitutional regime-for example, does not seek to use the state's coercive power to deprive women of their equal political and civil rights
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

11 at
l at
Id. at
1 at
I& at
Id. at
Id. at

60-61.
54-66.
54-58.
56-57.
60-61.
xvi.
59.

1324

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1319

and liberties-it is not to be dismissed as unreasonable. This is true
no matter how offensive others may find the doctrine, and no matter
how unfair-by the standards of justice internal to others' comprehensive doctrines-it may be. So Okin's move to prohibit as unreasonable comprehensive doctrines that advocate, say, sexist divisions of
family labor, but do not seek to legally enforce such divisions, is not a
move that Rawls need accept. 23 Nor, clearly, would he be entitled to

make this move even should he wish.
IV.

IN WHAT WAY MUST FAMImms BE JUST IN ORDER FOR

SOCmTY TO BE JUST?2 4

To properly situate the criticism we have been considering within
Rawls's theory, we need to see how it constitutes a refinement of a
more general feminist criticism, namely, that for society to be just,
families must be just, but that features of Rawls's theory in Political
Liberalism prevent it from ensuring that families are in fact sufficiently just for society to be just. Okin writes, for example, that in
Rawls's A Theory of Justice, "families and associations were assumed
and recognized to be just. In the new account, the political/nonpolitical dichotomy seems to preclude this."' But,
if, in the just society, families and churches are not required
to be just but can be organized hierarchically (with this ordering justified by "nature," say, or divine law), how is it possible for those who spend a far greater (as well as more
intense) part of their lives in these institutions than in any
"politica" activity to think of themselves as free and equal
26
citizens, as Rawls requires them to in the political realm?
The suggestion here is that the particular distinction between the
political and the nonpolitical in Political Liberalism is causing the
23. Okin raises the issue of the reasonableness of sexist comprehensive doctrines because she believes it is an inconsistency for Rawls, in his own theory, to accommodate
them. But her broader point does not depend on accepting Rawls's notion of reasonableness, as can be seen in her remark that "[e]ven if such religions were otherwise to pass
Rawls's test of reasonableness, the degree and extent of sex discrimination that they both
preach and practice should make them impermissible in a just society." Okin,supra note
7, at 32.
24. My arguments in this section have greatly benefitted from the study of Rawls's
lecture on women and the family. Women and the Family, supra note 6.
25. Susan Moller Okin, Book Reviews: Political Theory, 87 AM. POL. Sch R v. 1010,
1011 (1993) (reviewing RAwts, supra note 1).
26. Id.
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trouble. But, in fact, as we have seen, the general structure of Rawls's
theory is enough to set off warning bells.
Let us begin with the suggestion that for society to be just, families must be just. To determine Rawls's response to this stance, we
need to ask, according to what standard of justice are families said to
need to be just if the broader society is to be just? Just in what sense?
We can distinguish three distinct standards of family justice: (1) just
according to a feminist comprehensive doctrine; (2) just in the sense
of being internally ordered by Rawls's two principles of justice; or (3)
just by virtue of the family's conformity to the constraints imposed by
the requirements of a just basic structure.
A.

Just According to a Feminist Comprehensive Doctrine

Rawls's view rules out the first of these standards as improper. 27
In a society characterized by reasonable pluralism, the standards of
justice internal to one reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot
fairly be imposed on others who affirm a contrary reasonable comprehensive doctrine. 28 Let us return to our earlier suggestion that one
who affirms a feminist comprehensive doctrine will reject the Adam's
rib view of women's role as not only pernicious but false. What impresses Rawls about this case is that according to some orthodox or
fundamentalist religious views, for instance, the symmetric criticismits very mirror image-can be made that, given Scriptural knowledge,
the feminist's view is plainly wrong and her belief system is corrupt.
Each of these views is, from the point of view of the other "just another sectarian doctrine." And because the dispute between these
views cannot be resolved by public reason, using common methods of
inquiry and argument (such as uncontroversial science and common
sense), the state should also regard them as sectarian doctrines without special claim to be promoted by the state as "the truth." This is
not to deny that one of these views is true. Nevertheless, since the
claim that it is true "cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally," neither side may legitimately enlist state power.29 Rawls writes:
[I]n recognizing others' comprehensive views as reasonable,
citizens also recognize that, in the absence of a public basis
of establishing the truth of their beliefs, to insist on their
comprehensive view must be seen by others as their insisting
27. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 60-61.
28. IL at 24.
29. I. at 61.
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on their own beliefs. If we do so insist, others in self-defense
can oppose us as using upon them unreasonable force.3
Thus, neither side may use the law to impose its own conception of
familial justice, internal to its own comprehensive doctrine, on the
other. These comprehensive doctrines are to be held not to each
but to the standards of a
other's doctrinal standards of family justice,
1
public political conception of justice?
So Rawls's view will not side with the feminist in directly imposing that comprehensive doctrine by, for example, legally requiring that
divisions of labor within the family be equitable. Part of the reason
for this is that gender-hierarchical religious views with their accompanying forms of life, so long as they are voluntarily entered into and not
unreasonable, must be allowed if parties in the original position wish
to protect their freedom to practice their religion. After all, the parties in the original position know that they may turn out-once the
veil of ignorance is lifted-to affirm such views. And Rawls believes
they should want to protect their freedom of religious practice because it is necessary in order to protect the exercise of their moral
power to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good.32 Rawls
holds that our recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism requires
us to allow patriarchal marriages-whatever some may think of such
marriages-provided that the state ensures that both marriage and
religious membership are nonmandatory and exitable, and the
broader society guarantees women's equal rights, protects children
from neglect and abuse, and educates children as to their rights as
citizens.33
B. Just As in .InternallyOrdered by Rawls's Two Principles
Let us consider the second standard by which families might be
said to need to be just if society is to be just, namely, they must be
internally orderedby Rawls's public politicalconception ofjustice. Evidently, Okin thinks Rawls is committed to using this standard by
placing the family within the basic structure. 4 But Okin is mistaken.
The fact that an institution belongs to the basic structure does not
30. Id at 247.
31. Id. at 150-54.
32. Id at 74, 202-03.

33. Women and the Family, supra note 6, at 8.
34. Referring to the political values Rawls takes his principles of justice for the basic

structure to express, including fair equality of opportunity and economic reciprocity, Okin
writes: "Since the family is part of the basic structure, all these values should surely apply
within them." Okin, supra note 7, at 27 n.12 (emphasis added).
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imply that it is to be internally ordered by Rawls's two principles of
justice. The principles of justice regulate the basic structure, which is
the system of interaction among a society's major political, economic,
and social institutions. The principles of justice govern this interaction; they govern "how [a society's main political, social, and economic institutions] fit together into one unified system of social
cooperation from one generation to the next."3 They do not govern
each institution individually, by ordering its internal life. For instance,
a supreme court is an institution of the basic structure, but it is not
supposed to decide individual cases affecting the wealth of the litigants according to the difference principle. 36 Similarly, the two principles limit the range of market operation within the basic structure by,
for example, prohibiting the sale of citizens' liberties, but they do not
internally order markets, taking the place of the law of supply and
demand. A just basic structure does indeed impose constraints on institutions and associations, but the principles of justice do not directly
order their internal life.
Rawls offers the example that while churches are constrained by
the principles of justice, which guarantee citizens the liberty to leave
their faith, and do not recognize heresy and apostasy as legal crimes,
the principles of justice do not require church governance to be democratic, or require churches to organize their offices so as to satisfy the
difference principle.37
The same is true for families. Although the family as an institution is subject to the constraints that the principles impose on all
associations, families are not to be internally ordered by those principles. We need not, for example, distribute goods to our children in
accordance with the difference principle, nor, Rawls thinks, would this
be desirable. 38 The principles of justice constrain families in obvious
ways-their members may not be deprived of their political and civil
liberties, sold into slavery, assaulted, or battered. And the constraints
of a just basic structure rule out some family practices. Rawls gives as
an example primogeniture, the systematic favoring of the first-born
child. 39 A policy of primogeniture would be undone by the basic
structure's property laws governing inheritance and bequest that are
35. RAWLs, supra note 1, at 11 (emphasis added).
36. See 1d. at 233-34; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-65 (1971) [hereinafter A
THEORY OF JUSTICE].
37. Women and the Family, supra note 6, at 2.

38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 3 n.7.
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needed to ensure fair equality of opportunity and to satisfy the difference principle.
Interestingly, the same feature of political liberalism that requires
it to countenance some regressive family practices also protects progressive family forms. It is important to see that the nature of the
family-the forms families take-such as monogamous, polygamous,
heterosexual, homosexual, nuclear, extended, or communal-makes
no difference in Rawls's view, provided that families can effectively
rear future citizens and respect the equal rights of citizens. If so-called
alternative family forms can raise children to the necessary standards
of civic virtue, without "running afoul" of other political values, then
Rawls's conception of justice has no objection to them. Indeed, Rawls
must defend them as issuing from citizens' reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. Alternative families find an unexpected friend in Rawis.
If there are family forms that undermine the family's role in upholding a constitutional regime, these may be prohibited, just as family practices that violate the constraints on associations imposed by a
just basic structure may be prohibited. Otherwise, family forms and
practices may be as their members desire, according to their own comprehensive doctrines. Rawls's commitment to allowing any family
form compatible with the effective development of future citizens accounts for the peculiar language Rawls uses in talking about the family as part of the basic structure. He writes: "The basic structure is
understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system.... Thus the political constitution, the legally
recognized forms of property, and the organization of the economy,
' 40 Here
and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure.
Rawls speaks, not of the family, but of the nature of the family, that is,
the selection of its acceptable forms, given its social role. So while the
nature of the family is part of the overall social structure the principles
of justice order, families are not to be internally ordered by the two
principles.
This observation allows us to sort out a further apparent confusion in Okin's understanding of Rawls's theory. Okin writes that
"[o]n families, Rawls is much less clear than in A Theory of Justice.
Now they are both specified as part of the basic structure (p. 258) and
said to be nonpolitical (pp. 10, 137, 195). But this, given Rawls's defi41
nition of the political, involves a contradiction in terms." I conjec40. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 258 (emphasis added).

41. Okin, supra note 25, at 1010 (referencing pages in RAwLs, supra note 1).
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ture that Okin thinks that this stance is a contradiction because she
believes that the principles of justice directly order the institutions
that belong to the basic structure, but do not order nonpolitical associations. But, pace Okin, while the nature of the family belongs to
the basic structure, the domain of the familial is nonpolitical, and this
is not a contradiction in terms. Families are identified as nonpolitical
precisely because the principles of justice apply to them only indirectly; there is no way to distinguish the political domain from the
nonpolitical domain of the associational, the familial, and the personal, apart from seeing how the principles of justice apply to a domain, whether directly or indirectly.
One especially interesting feature of Rawls's view is that the distinctive social role of the family also imposes reciprocallimits on other
arrangements of the basic structure. According to Rawls, we are to
think of society as a system of fair social cooperation that continues
indefinitely, from one generation to the next.42 The family serves as
the primary means for the orderly reproduction of society over time,
by serving as the locus for rearing and educating future citizens in
sufficient numbers to maintain society.43 We can imagine alternative
institutions to that of the family for raising children and ensuring their
moral development into free and equal citizens with the necessary
political virtues. But we presently, and for the most part, use the family for this purpose, and Rawls does assume that the family in some
form is just. What this means, I take it, is that the principles of justice
do not require us to abolish families and rather, for example, rear children collectively in state-run institutions. One might think that the
principle of fair equality of opportunity would, in fact, require this,
since differences in upbringing do differentially affect opportunities.
But Rawls assumes that the family in some form, appropriately supported and regulated, is compatible with his principles of justice.'
Consequently, the needs of the family, as the mechanism of the just
society's reproduction over time, impose constraints on the ways that
fair equality of opportunity can be pursued, and may even require a
weaker form of the opportunity principle than Rawls has so far defended. This further specifies how the nature of the family belongs to
the basic structure.
The status Rawls affords the family is quite interesting, because if
we ask why the institution of the family should have this special sta42. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 3, 14.

43. Women and the Family, supra note 6, at 1.
44. RAwts, supra note 1, at xxix.
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tus-why permit the family, but only the family, to reciprocally constrain the principles of justice-it is not at all obvious what answer
Rawls can give. 45 It would be natural to say that the family is given
this unique standing because many people care so intensely about
raising their children themselves, but this answer is not available to
Rawls, who cannot count the greater intensity of a desire as a legitimate reason to compromise justice. Rawls insists that "[c]itizens are
to recognize ...

that the weight of their claims is not given by the

strength and psychological intensity of their wants and desires (as opposed to their needs as citizens), even when their wants and desires
are rational from their point of view,"'46 and that "[t]he fact that we
have a compelling desire.., does not argue for the propriety of its
satisfaction any more than the strength of a conviction argues for its
truth."47 Besides, were Rawls to admit this sort of consideration
about the centrality of an institution to people's fulfillment as a reason
for compromising justice, others who, for example, find primary
meaning in their religion would be on equally firm ground to demand
that the principles of justice should also give way to the needs of their
religion-a possibility that Rawls explicitly rejects.'
A second possible account of the special status of the familyavailable to us, but again, not to Rawls-would be that a vast majority
of citizens favor assigning the family this, status. For Rawls, majority
support can legitimate policies or practices only if these are deemed
permissible by the prior and independent principles of justice.49
There is, however, a third possibility, that is available to Rawls.
The family might warrant special status if it is plausible to suppose
that the moral development of children necessary to their becoming
fully cooperating citizens requires an intense personal adult-to-child
relationship of love and trust, and if it is plausible to suppose further
that state-run child-rearing institutions would be significantly less
likely than are families to provide the needed intimate relationship. If
the reliable reproduction of a just society over time requires that children be raised in families, then the family's special status would be
justifiable. This sort of necessary precondition for the reproduction of
a just society would serve to justify reciprocal constraints on the prin45. My thinking on this question has profited from discussion with Gerasimos Santas
and Gary Watson.
46. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 34.
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id.
49. See id at 73.
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ciples of justice. Rawls's project is to identify principles of justice appropriate to a system of social cooperation among free and equal
citizens from one generation to the next indefinitely. This project
could hardly be said to have identified appropriate principles for such
a system where its principles prohibited an institutional form necessary to the system's continued existence. So this type of argument
could do the work Rawls needs done. I suspect that something like
this is actually what Rawls intends. His account in A Theory of Justice
of children's development of a sense of justice actually posits the necessity of an intense personal relationship between an adult and a
child in which the child's perception of the adult's evident love for her
and desire for her good for her own sake sets in motion the child's
moral development.5 0 What is missing in Rawls's account is any argument that families more reliably provide the needed relationship than
state institutions could be expected to do. But perhaps we could construct such an argument in a way that would not be entirely
implausible.
C. Just As in Subject to the Constraintsa Just Basic Structure
Imposes
To return to our main line of argument, we have seen Rawls's
reasons for rejecting the first two senses in which it might be said that
families must be just. This brings us to the third sense, that they must
be just as in subject to the constraints a just basic structure imposes.
This Rawls agrees with, indeed insists upon.5 ' Families are composed
of equal citizens and future equal citizens, and the principles of justice
guarantee basic rights, liberties, and fair opportunities for each of
them. We could say that this requires that families be just, but it
would be truer to Rawls's meaning-and also to his style-to say that
permissible family forms must not be unjust according to the standard
of the two principles. So in this sense of family justice, Rawls will
agree with the feminist that families must be just.
This third sense is considerably weaker than the first two, but
even in this weaker sense, justice requires quite a lot. It arguably implies protected exit from marriage or the choice not to marry, with
guarantees, in cases of divorce, of the equitable division of marital
assets and equitable paternal support for children; and equal access to
equally good jobs, which would require public or publicly subsidized
50. RAwLs, supra note 36, at 462-74.
51. Women and the Family, supra note 6, at 3.
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provision of adequate child care, flex time, and family leave. Rawls
can and should accept Okin's suggestion 52 that employers be required
to split paychecks between employees and their homeworking
spouses. Justice in this third sense may require comparable worth policies and affirmative action for women. Rawls himself even goes so
far as to argue that justice requires, as necessary to the equality of
women as equal citizens, that women be guaranteed a right to abortion in the first trimester-and perhaps beyond. 53 Justice, in this
sense, prohibits neglect and abuse of children, and requires their education in the rights and duties of citizenship and, importantly, that
their education enable them to be "economically independent and
self-supporting members of society over a complete life." 54 This last
requirement is especially important to achieving women's equality.
This mandatory content to the education of every child is very
important because it makes it clear to citizens that the associations in
which they are raised neither define nor exhaust the political rights
they enjoy as citizens. So while clubs, churches, and families may,
within broad limits, operate according to their own rules and values,
they do so with members whom the broader society has educated as to
their rights as citizens. Clearly this mandatory content to children's
education partially disempowers associations; but it is needed to preserve the capacities of individuals to form, revise, and pursue their
own plans of life.
V.

SITUATING THE FEMINIST CRITICISM

But do Rawls's provisions sufficiently disempower associations
from a feminist point of view? It is true that all of these measures
taken together still allow families to adopt unequal divisions of labor
and affirm sexist beliefs about natural hierarchy. Why might the feminist still maintain that this indirect regulation of families by the principles of justice does not ensure that families are just enough for society
to be just? One plausible answer is that such regulation permits families that impose serious psychological barriers to genuine equality and
to the stable reproduction of Rawls's well-ordered society.
One real problem is that the principles of justice do less to order
the internal life of families than might be thought necessary for the
52. This is one of Okin's many important suggestions for policies that would increase
the equality of women. See SUSAN MOLLER OIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY

(1989).
53. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 243 n.32.

54. Id.at 199-200.
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girls raised in them to be psychologically capable of making use of
their (potentially) equal political and material resources. Although
Rawls's theory addressed the problem that material inequality upsets
political equality and renders it merely formal, his theory does not
address the concern that his principles would allow children to be so
raised that they are psychologically and motivationally incapable of
taking advantage of their equal material opportunities and so of realizing their basic liberties as citizens.
This, I think, is the real heart of Okin's concern in the passage I
quoted in Part IV.55 It can be put in a form analogous to that of the
famous Marxian criticism of liberal theories, that the material inequalities liberal theories allow render their equal liberties merely formal. 56
The analogous criticism is that some forms of child rearing, flagrantly
sexist ones for instance, create such psychological barriers to equality
that those girls raised in them cannot use their material and formal
freedoms to any advantage. A second and related problem is that
households which manifest injustice, through, for example, an inequitable division of labor, will render the children raised in them psychologically incapable of regarding one another as equals.
Now, can Rawls simply dismiss these criticisms on the grounds
that people's internal psychological states, though the stock and trade
of utilitarians, are not his concern? Rawls, after all, famously proposes a mechanism for comparisons of well-being-an index of primary goods-that is purposely nonsubjective and nonpsychological,5 7
and excludes from political reasoning the so-called "special psychologies," such as envy and a daredevil attitude toward risk taking.58 And
Rawls insists that features of people's psychological makeup, such as
their tastes and preferences, are to be treated as their own responsibility, and not to be catered to in either determining or applying the
principles of justice.5 9 So one imagines that Rawls's first inclination
would be to insist that a political theory need not-and should notbe concerned with the inner workings of people's psyches.
Nevertheless, Rawls cannot get off the hook that easily; there is a
natural way of reformulating the feminist concern in terms that
Rawls's own theory requires him to take seriously. That way is to
urge that severely sexist families will make it impossible for the chil55. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., R.G. PEFFER, MARmSM, MoRALrTY,

AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1990).

57. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 179-80, 189 n.20.
58. A THEORY oF JusTCE, supra note 36, at 530-34.
59. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 178-90.
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dren raised in them to develop the two moral powers normally necessary for full citizenship.
Of course we are tempted to simply say that sexist upbringings
are harmful. But to observe this is not in itself enough to engage
Rawls's theory. Different political theories will have different ways of
understanding the harm that sexist upbringings cause children. A
comprehensive liberal like John Stuart Mill6" might see the harm as
one of impeding girls' realization of their full potential; egalitarians
like Richard Arneson 6 ' and G.A. Cohen 62 might see the harm as one
of depriving girls of equal opportunities for welfare; utilitarians like
Amartya Sen63 might see the harm as one of relatively constraining
their functionings. None of these ways of understanding the harm of a
sexist upbringing engages Rawls's theory. The relevant sense of harm
for Rawls's theory is sufficient harm to the two moral powers such
that fair social cooperation is undermined.
Recall that the two moral powers are the capacity to have and act
from a sense of justice, and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a
conception of the goodf.' Rawls is committed to the view that conditions which make the development of these impossible are to be prohibited, and conditions necessary for their development, such as
mandatory education in the rights of citizenship, must be enforced,
even if they abridge other essential freedoms, such as freedom of conscience or the exercise of religion. 65 The development of an effective
sense of justice is necessary if a well-ordered society is to reproduce
itself over time. It is this moral power that makes cooperation on fair
terms possible, and it is the other moral power that specifies the sense
in which citizens are to be thought of as free. Citizens are free because they are politically regarded as self-authenticating sources of
valid claims, and so, for political purposes, as independent of their
affirmation of any particular comprehensive doctrine.66 The feminist
concern is that children raised in sexist homes will not develop an ef60. See JoHN STuART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1982) (1859); JOHN STUART MILL, TE SUBJECrTION OF WOMEN (Prometheus Books 1986)
(1869).
61. See Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL.
STUD. 77 (1989).

62. See G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of EgalitarianJustice, 99 ETHIcs 906 (1989).,
63. See

AmARTYA SEN,

Equality of What?, 1 THE

TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN

(1980), reprintedin CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353 (1982); Amartya
Sen, Well-being, Agency and Freedom, 82 J. PHIL. 169 (1985).
64. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 19, 103-04.
65. Id at 199-200.
66. Id at 30, 32.
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fective sense of justice, and especially girls in those homes wil be prevented from forming or revising their conception of the good across
anything like the meaningful range of conceptions available to boys.
When stated in this way, this concern is one that Rawls must face.
Forms of child rearing that stunt the development of the two moral
powers of future citizens effectively annihilate citizens because a citizen is by Rawls's abstract definition nothing more than one who possesses the two moral powers to the minimum degree necessary to
engage in fair social cooperation over a complete life. 67
VI.

REFINING THE FEMINIST CRIIcisM

To consider this criticism we first need to better specify its content. The criticism cannot plausibly be urging that Rawls's theory tolerates only optimific family forms-forms that develop to the highest
possible degree the two moral powers. This would almost certainly
involve far more state interference with families' internal lives than
would be consistent with recognition of their basic liberties, and it
would probably be inconsistent with the adoption of the family form
as the mechanism of child rearing. Moreover, Rawls explicitly stipulates that citizens are to be regarded as possessing the two moral powers to "the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating
members of society."' Differences above the minimum are irrelevant
from the point of view of the theory of justice and do not affect the
rights of citizens. 69 According to Rawls, possession of the two moral
powers is a threshold notion, not a maximandum. What he seeks is
the adequate development and full exercise of those powers.70 Thus,
if the feminist criticism were that Rawls's theory lets in family forms,
suboptimal for purposes of development of the moral powers, though
still minimally adequate, the logic of Rawls's own position would not
require him to address this criticism.
The feminist criticism urges that the sorts of egregiously sexist
practices we might see in some, say, orthodox and fundamentalist
households make it impossible for the children raised in them to develop the two moral powers to even the requisite minimum degree. If
this criticism is plausible, and if Rawls's theory cannot meet it, then
Rawls's theory is in serious trouble.
67. Id. at 18-19.
68. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).

69. Id at 79-81.
70. Id. at 74-76, 106, 202, 333.
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Is it plausible that boys raised in such families almost always grow
into men unable to acknowledge the equal political liberties of women, to treat women as Rawls's two principles of justice require, or to
act with civility toward them in the public forum? Is it plausible that
girls raised in such families will almost always grow into women unable to access their economic and social opportunities, who are therefore condemned to relive the lives of their mothers? These are
obviously empirical questions given that the criticism involves an empirical claim about the psychological development of children under
certain social conditions. But a couple of considerations may cause us
to question the plausibility of the criticism.
It is probably no exaggeration to say that almost all of us who are
now feminists were raised in sexist households-this is certainly true
of older feminists, though it is perhaps increasingly less the rule with
younger feminists.71 What this suggests is that sexist upbringings do
not necessarily preclude the choice of feminist lives though it may still
be true that most girls raised in sexist homes are unable to throw off
their yokes, and perhaps this is all the criticism needs. A more interesting question is a comparative one: Is a girl more likely to preserve
her option to choose a different lifestyle from the one in which she
was raised if she is raised in a feminist household rather than in a
sexist household? If developing and preserving the capacity to form,
revise, and pursue a conception of the good is what we seek, we must
ask whether it is easier for a girl raised by feminist norms to adopt a
sexist form of life, or whether it is easier for a girl raised in a sexist
household to adopt a feminist form of life. Which form of upbringing
makes it more possible to revise one's conception of the good?
If we take seriously the idea that a female subordinate mode of
life is an option to seriously consider, we may find that only those who
have been introduced to such a system as children can really choose to
embrace it later. We might argue, paradoxically, that it is harder for a
girl raised to think herself an equal to men to adopt a life of inferiority
than it is for a girl raised to think herself inferior to men to discover
that she is just as worthy and important as men and to adopt a corresponding mode of life.
This thought may have an analogy in the way we think about the
question of who is better suited to choose among religions, either to
have one of the many that exist in a pluralistic society, or to be atheist
71. Okin herself seems to recognize this possibility in Political Liberalism, Justice, and
Gender. Okin, supra note 7, at 38 n.32.
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or agnostic. The reasoning supporting the feminist criticism suggests
that to best preserve a child's options concerning religion, we should
raise that child in the less authoritarian, more liberal way-as an agnostic or perhaps an atheist. But many children raised in those ways
later report that they are quite unable to entertain seriously the idea
of a religious view. They find religion superstitious nonsense and not
something they can take seriously (at least in part) because they lack
the requisite sensibility.
In contrast, the numbers of fallen Catholics are, as they say, legion. While it may be true that some Sauls turn into Pauls, it appears
that vastly greater numbers of ordinary Joes revise or lose their childhood religion. So in this area at least, it may seem that psychological
freedom of choice is best preserved by training a child to the sensibilities of the less anomic, or more authoritarian view. If the choice of
sex roles is like this, then it may be that choice of a gendered or
nongendered mode of life is enhanced rather than diminished by allowing gendered upbringings within Rawis's controlled context of justice as guaranteed by his two principles.72
But perhaps paradoxical arguments should make us suspicious,
and a tempting place to focus this suspicion is on the argument's assumption that the best condition is one allowing for thd greatest revision of our comprehensive doctrine, or for the widest possible choice
of alternative doctrines. Not only is such an assumption generally suspect, 73 but Rawls is probably not entitled to make it. This assumption
indicates a comprehensive "change is good, choice is good, diversity is
good" doctrine-perhaps like John Stuart Mill's comprehensive liberalism. This view is one that Rawls's political liberalism would not be
entitled to because it must present its political conception as freestanding.74 And the assumption also looks like it will sit poorly with
72. If these assumptions are plausible, an interesting question arises. Suppose that
most girls raised in feminist conditions and very many girls raised in sexist conditions prefer feminist forms of life. Would not that count as evidence that feminist forms of life

are-at least for women-rationally superior? If so, the rational superiority of feminist
forms of life might provide an independent argument for raising girls in feminist conditions. Of course, a systematic preference for feminist forms of life might be explained in
some other way, as being more in line with selfish interests, for example, or as in some way
easier or less demanding than sexist forms of life. And, majority preferences may not
always be good indicators of value. But if these alternative explanations are unpersuasive,
we may wish to develop an argument along the lines suggested. I am grateful to Janet
Levin for alerting me to this possibility.
73. Consider, for example, how we would regard the analogous epistemic doctrine that
it is preferable for people to adopt highly fallible belief-forming mechanisms if this better
facilitates changing one's mind!
74. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 10.
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Rawls's insistence that unreasonable comprehensive doctrines need
not be tolerated even though ruling them out diminishes the range of
comprehensive doctrines available to citizens. 75 Rawls's theory will
not allow him to rest an argument on the assumption that the best
arrangements are those that maximize our options or capacity for
change.
In fact, Rawls disavows this maximizing idea in a passage from
Lecture VIII on the basic liberties and their priority. He writes:
First, a coherent notion of what is to be maximized is lacking.
We cannot maximize the development and exercise of two
moral powers at once. And how could we maximize the development and exercise of either power by itself? Do we
maximize, other things equal, the number of deliberate affirmations of a conception of the good? That would be absurd.
Moreover, we have no notion of a maximum development of
these powers.76
So we return to the threshold question. Do gendered families,
with sexist divisions of labor that feminist comprehensive doctrines
would deem unfair, so thwart children's development of the two moral
powers that they cannot reliably attain these powers even to the requisite minimum degree? The degree is that which is necessary to participate in and sustain a system of social cooperation on fair terms.
VII.

ASSESSING THE FEMINIST CRITICISM

One thing worth noting is that the effect on children's development of a sense of justice of unequal divisions of parental labor cannot
be determined without examining whether these unequal divisions are
or are not perceived by those family members as unjust. We should be
cautious about simply assuming that the justice or injustice of a family
arrangement can be directly "read-off" an objective description of
how labor is divided.
Consider three imaginary cases of heterosexual unions in which
labor is unequally divided between husband and wife, with the wife
bearing the objectively greater share, and their children witnessing
this unequal division of labor.

75. Id. at 196-200.
76. Id. at 333.
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A. Egalitarian-WelfaristConception of Justice
In the first case our couple are card-carrying egalitarian
welfarists, and though the wife does more work, she is a dynamo who
experiences the work as less burdensome than does her phlegmatic
husband. Consequently, their unequal division of labor results in an
equal distribution of utility between them. In this case, their division
of labor is not unfair by the standard of fairness that their comprehensive doctrine-namely, egalitarian welfarism-advocates for associations like families, though that same doctrine may tactically require a
different standard-like Rawls's two principles-for the basic structure of society. Indeed if our couple is to be part of an overlapping
consensus on Rawls's conception of justice, they will have to hold a
partially self-effacing welfarist doctrine, which allows that while we
may directly seek to equalize welfare in smaller associations, the closest approximation to this result in the broader society is achieved
when the basic structure is ordered by Rawls's two principles. At any
rate, this couple's division of labor is just according to the standard of
their comprehensive doctrine, and supposing they explain this standard to their children, there is no reason to assume that their children
will either lack a sense of justice altogether, or affirm a conception of
justice that is incompatible with the continued stability of the wellordered society.
B.

"Pay-Your-Own-Way" Conception of Justice

In the second case imagine a couple whose unequal division of
labor is the result of their prior preferences combined with their standard of fairness. In this family the wife wished to move to a grand
house with a huge garden because she expected to enjoy that manorial
lifestyle, while the husband, content with modest lodgings, opposed
moving from their small apartment on the grounds that house maintenance, yard work, and a larger house to clean would create a massive
amount of extra work that would be burdensome and detract from
their quality of life. They agreed that it would be unfair of her to
impose the house and the extra work on him, but they also agreed that
it would be unfair of him to deny her the enjoyment of living in such a
house. So they decided, in the interest of fairness, to move into the
grand house, but to assign the majority of responsibility for its upkeep
to the person who wanted the house, namely the wife. She does an
unequal share of the work because the lifestyle she wishes to lead is
costlier-in terms of labor-than the lifestyle her husband wishes to
lead. In this situation, the unequal division of labor is again dictated

1340

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1319

by the couple's conception of justice-which we might characterize as
a "pay-your-own-way" conception-in conjunction with their differing preferences concerning material luxury versus leisure. There
seems no reason to suppose that their children, if they are made aware
of the reason for their parents' division of labor, will either lack a
sense of justice, or find themselves unable to affirm Rawls's political
conception of justice for the broader society.
C. Communitarian Conception of Justice
In the third case our couple has a common dream of amassing
sufficient savings so that they can take an early retirement and sail
around the world for the rest of their days, visiting exotic ports of call
and living the bohemian life. This dream requires that the husband
devote himself to an extensive course of study to prepare to exploit
some rare talent in a job more lucrative than any other he or his wife
could acquire, while she single-handedly supports the family and
raises the children during their psychologically formative years. During this period their division of labor is observably radically unequal,
but they expect that in their post-childrearing but pre-retirement
years, her share of labor will be much smaller than his-they have
taken out insurance against contingencies that would upset this expectation. It is their common goal and expectation of future compensation to the wife for her early sacrifices that enables them to square this
arrangement with their conception of fairness-a "communitarian"
conception according to which labor contributions are determined by
the requirements of achieving the common good. Do we have any
reason to suppose that children raised in this household must fail to
acquire a sense of justice, or possess a perverted one? There seems no
reason to suppose this, provided that their parents' rationale for the
unequal division of labor is explained to them.
D. An Analysis of the Three Cases
The moral of these three stories, I take it, is that we cannot readoff the effect on children's development of a sense of justice of a family's division of labor from a pure description of who does what apart
from an understanding of how the participants justify that division of
labor to one another. The observably unequal divisions of labor in
these families are dictated by each family's own conception of familial
justice, and we assume that their children are made aware of the family's rationale in terms of justice for its unequal division of labor. But
that means that their children are being raised in households where
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justice is taken to matter and is thought to have been done. It is difficult to see how we could have grounds for claiming that such family
forms must have a stultifying effect on the moral development of the
children raised in them. Perhaps it is true that to develop a sense of
justice one must be raised in a household that operates according to
some plausible conception of justice. But this does not imply that the
operative conception of justice must be the one that we affirm-or
that Rawls affirms-for family life. Provided the conception of intrafamily justice allows its adherents to affirm the political conception
of justice for the basic structure, it may be that many different conscientiously applied standards of family justice can allow for children's
adequate moral development.
But if this is right, and if we allow the conceptions of familial
fairness contained in the comprehensive doctrines of the families we
have just considered, on what basis should we exclude religiously dictated nonegalitarian conceptions of family justice? From the point of
view of a feminist comprehensive doctrine, none of these conceptions
is the correct one, yet all are equally the issue of some comprehensive
doctrine. Once we grant that unequal divisions of family labor are
compatible with the moral development of children so long as they
issue from and conform to the conception of family justice given by
the family's comprehensive doctrine, and their rationale in terms of
justice is explained to children, then there seems to be no justification
for singling out religiously motivated inequalities for special condemnation. For it is not obvious that there is anything special about conceptions of justice based upon religious comprehensive doctrines as
compared with conceptions based upon secular comprehensive doctrines that would warrant the former's exclusion and the latter's allowance. 7 These religious families also have a rationale for their unequal
divisions of labor, which, if perceived by their members as consistent
with fairness, may be perfectly compatible with their children developing an effective sense of justice. So long as the operative in77. One might urge that there is something special about religiously based sexist divisions of family labor, namely, that they assert the inherent inferiority of women, or women's subservient position relative to men as axioms. But it is not at all clear that these
claims are true. A religious view might defend a sexual division of labor on the grounds
that women are different, rather than inferior-a kind of "separate but equal" argument.
Or, another view might suggest that women's subordinate status might be said to be derived from more basic religious assumptions that are not themselves sexist. To establish
that religion-based divisions of labor are especially objectionable, we would need to rule
out these alternative sorts of accounts. Religious families themselves may view their family
division of labor as an instance of the third sort of case described above.
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trafamily conception belongs to a comprehensive doctrine that can be
part of an overlapping consensus on Rawls's political conception to
govern the basic structure, we cannot justifiably assume that children
will be unable to acquire an effective sense of justice.
But if it is replied that no deviation from an equal division of
labor between men and women is compatible with children's development of correct substantive views on family justice, and so state power
should be used to legally enforce equal divisions of labor within families, our three cases allow us to appreciate Rawls's concerns about
how oppressive that enforcement might be. All three of our families,
as well as the religious family, would judge this to be the imposition of
an unjust division of labor. We might be inclined to reply that the fact
that the women in these families would see that imposition as unjust
simply testifies to their false consciousness. We may think that their
objective inequality in the broader society requires that they delude
themselves about what is family justice, and thus we may wish to discount their sincerely affirmed beliefs and desires and their perception
of their interests, as ideological adaptations to their objectively disadvantaged circumstances. 78 While there is surely something to this reply against the background of our present, unjust society, it is unclear
whether social conditions in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness would warrant our discounting people's similar beliefs and
desires as false consciousness.79 What is clear enough is that legally
enforcing an equal division of labor on these families would render
their freedoms of conscience, association, and religion largely ineffective in ordering their family life. It would also restrict or prohibit pursuit of their not unreasonable conceptions of the good in the centrally
important domain of family life.
In a society well ordered by Rawls's two principles, where unequal divisions of family labor do not reflect women's inequality in the
society at large-do not reflect, for example, discrimination against
women in employment that drives down their relative wages and so
makes it more economically rational for women to do the domestic
and child-rearing labor, the remaining gendered divisions of labor will
issue from people's comprehensive doctrines. Because from the
state's point of view, citizens' relation to their comprehensive doctrines is a voluntary one-that is, the state does not require citizens to
affirm some particular comprehensive doctrine as a condition of citi78. 1 am indebted to Ed McCann and Kadri Vihvelin for calling this concern to my
attention.
79. I take up a related point in the next two paragraphs.
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zenship-one must also regard the gendered divisions of labor that
issue from their comprehensive doctrines as voluntary. While justice
as fairness insists upon eliminating involuntary gendered divisions of
labor, resulting from the pressures of an unjust broader society, it
must protect such divisions when they are voluntary, precisely because
they are connected with citizens' fundamental freedoms of religion
and conscience.8°
Although it is comforting to think that the feminist concern is one
that empirical science can settle for us, this is certainly an oversimplification. The question is not simply whether sexist upbringings do compromise children's acquisition of the two moral powers, but whether
they would do so in Rawls's well-ordered society, against the background of a just basic structure ordered by principles of justice that
enjoyed the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines. This is a question about a world so different from our own
grossly unjust world that it is hard to answer. It is difficult to determine what would be the effect of intrafamily sexism if the broader
society were truly well ordered, but it is plausible to suppose that the
well-ordered society of justice as fairness would exert a liberalizing
pressure on the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that could survive and flourish in that society.81 Just as we see certain churchessuch as the Episcopal church-liberalize under the influence -of constitutional and democratic politics, so we might expect to see other
associations alter their comprehensive doctrines toward greater congruence with democratic principles. This suggests that we may have
no way to settle, in advance of actually living in Rawls's just society,
the question of whether or not such a society could ensure the development of children's moral powers to a degree adequate to maintain
the just society over time.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

How should we assess the feminist criticism presented? It seems
to me that the objection as originally stated is inconclusive. We cannot tell whether Rawls's well-ordered society would be self-sustaining.
But the criticism may suggest a further problem for Rawls, which I
shall simply describe without discussion. If sexist upbringings in our
current, unjust society undermine children's capacity for a sense of
justice, how can we realistically expect to bring citizens of this society
80. See Women and the Family, supra note 6 (developing at length idea that voluntary
societal gendered division of labor should be protected).

81. See RAwLs, supra note 1, at 6.
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to see Rawls's well-ordered society as desirable? In particular, if continuing practices of the nonideal world make the realization of
Rawls's ideal theory utopian-if we cannot get there from here because our current practices prevent us from embracing the ideal theory's vision of the just society-then we must revise the impeding
practices. But Rawls's own theory suggests that most forms of state
action to revise these practices would be themselves unjust. We may
wonder then, whether political liberalism, unlike any earlier comprehensive liberalism, deprives itself of the resources needed to create
the conditions for its own acceptance.

